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Abstract 
 
There is an extensive and growing literature on the design and use of stated 
choice experiments. Such experiments are generally regarded as the preferred 
framework within which to collect data to reveal the preferences of individuals in a 
particular application context. Analysts have developed sophisticated ways of 
analysing such data, typically using a form of discrete choice model that identifies 
the marginal (dis)utility associated with each observed attribute linked to an 
alternative, as well as accounting for sources of preference and scale 
heterogeneity. There is also a growing literature studying the attribute processing 
rules (or heuristics) that respondents use as a way of simplifying the task of 
choosing, for all manner of meaningful reason. We find that there is relatively less 
effort placed on looking closely at the data defining each choice situation for each 
respondent, as constructed by the stated choice experiment, and seeing if there 
exist „evidential‟ rules that support in a plausible way, the choice responses. 
Heuristics investigated in this paper that might aid in our understanding of how 
choice scenarios are processed, leading to a choice outcome, include the role of 
dimensional vs. holistic attribute processing, the influence of relative attribute 
levels, and the revision of the reference alternative as value learning across 
sequenced choice sets. We find a high level of confidence in the evidence, and 
identify at least two features of choice set processing, namely value learning and 
majority of confirming dimensions, that are worthy of future inclusion in the 
estimation of all choice models. The evidence suggests that there is a great deal of 
behavioural sense in stated choice responses, for all manner of possible reason. 
 
Keywords:  Choice experiments, plausible choice, heuristics, sequence effects, 
referencing, reference revision, value learning, attribute processing, majority of 
confirming dimensions, evidential rules 
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1 Introduction  
 
Stated choice experiments are used extensively to create data capable of modelling 
choices in order to obtain parameter estimates that describe the preferences of 
individuals for specific attributes of alternatives within a pre-defined choice setting 
(Louviere et al. 2000). The popularity of such choice experiments is in part a product 
of the lack of appropriate revealed preference data in situations where choosing 
amongst a number of alternatives can be observed in real markets, but also due to the 
ability, within a single unified theoretical framework, to investigate the potential take 
up of alternatives which do not currently exist in terms of the levels and mix of 
attributes and/or uniqueness beyond a set of prescribed attributes. 
It is common practice for analysts to pool the data from a sample of respondents, 
accounting for the presence of multiple observations for each respondent, and then to 
estimate a discrete choice model, accounting to varying degrees for observed and 
unobserved preference heterogeneity, and more recently also scale heterogeneity (see 
Fiebig et al. 2010 and Greene and Hensher 2010 as examples). There is also a growing 
interest in investigating the role that specific attribute processing heuristics play in 
conditioning the influence of each attribute associated with each alternative (see 
Hensher 2010 for an overview, Hess and Hensher 2010, and Cameron and DeShazo 
2010), using a variety of supplementary questions on how attributes are processed 
and/or developing model functional-forms that capture specific heuristics. Another 
area of growing interest, particularly in the non-market valuation literature, is research 
into behavioural explanations for the preference changes that appear to occur over a 
sequence of choice tasks, using parametric (Bateman et al. 2008, Day et al. 2009, 
McNair et al. 2010a) and non-parametric tests (Day and Pinto 2010) as well as 
equality-constrained latent class models (McNair et al. 2010b). 
What we believe is not given enough emphasis is the extent to which we can 
learn from an interrogation of each response at the choice set level, and set up 
candidate rules, or heuristics (often referred to as „rules of thumb‟) that align with one 
or more possible processing rules used by an individual, within and between 
sequentially administered choice sets, to reveal their choice response. Specifically, the 
analysis herein is looking for evidence that would be consistent with respondents‟ use 
of heuristics to make choices in stated choice experiments. This matters because of the 
small, but accumulating empirical evidence, that alternative attribute processing 
strategies (APS) do influence behavioural outputs such as estimates of willingness to 
pay and model predictive capability (see Hensher 2010 for an overview). While we 
can never be certain that a specific rule is applied, we are seeking out a way to gain 
confidence in the evidence, given that some pundits believe that respondents are 
known to make choices which have no „rational‟ attachment.  
To illustrate the focus of this paper, we reproduce, in Table 1, data from one 
respondent in one of many choice experiments the authors have conducted
1
, in the 
context of choosing amongst three routes for a commuter trip, where the first route 
description is the reference or status quo (SQ) alternative associated with a recent trip. 
The design attributes are free flow time (FF), slowed down time (SDT), running cost 
(Cost), toll if applicable (Toll), and overall trip time variability (Var) (times are in 
minutes, costs in dollars, and time variability in plus or minus minutes). We begin 
with the most commonly assumed normative processing rule which assumes (in the 
                                           
1
 We undertook this exact same exercise on a number of data sets and a number of respondents 
in each data set and the message was the same or very similar. 
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absence of any known attribute processing heuristic) that all attributes (and levels) are 
relevant, and that a fully compensatory processing strategy is active at the choice set 
level. Focussing on these five attributes only, we highlight in shaded grey the most 
attractive attribute level (e.g., lowest FF), which varies across the attributes, and 
propose that if an alternative had the most attractive level on one or more attributes, 
and that alternative was chosen, then we can reasonably suggest that the respondent 
was „plausible‟ in their choice, assuming that the heuristic being used to process the 
choice set preserves (i.e., does not ignore) the attribute(s) with the „most attractive 
level(s)‟ based, of course, on only the offered attributes. Applying the same logic 
across all of the sixteen choices that each respondent made, we found that 51 of the 
300 respondents are consistently selecting options which are best on the same 
attribute, where the experimental design does not allow them to consistently choose 
such that two or more attributes are always best. 
There could be other reasons why an alternative is chosen, regardless of the 
attribute levels and their relative performance, such as satisfaction with the status quo 
or the adoption of a minimum regret calculus, in contrast to a utility maximisation 
calculus (see Chorus 2009 and Hensher et al. 2010).  Indeed, if a respondent focuses 
on only one attribute, then we might be observing a consistent elimination-by-aspects 
heuristic
2
. However, on the face of the observed attribute evidence, the 16 choice 
scenarios satisfy a „plausible choice‟ test in 16 situations. Five of the choice scenarios 
show the status quo as the preferred alternative (bolded in the choice column). It may 
also be that this example individual adopts one or more attribute processing (AP) rules 
in evaluating the choice scenarios, which may be the basis of choice in any of the 16 
choice sets, regardless of whether they have passed the „plausibility‟ test used above. 
We investigate a number of these AP rules in the following sections. 
Furthermore, supplementary data associated with the respondents' perception of 
whether specific attributes were ignored or added up (where they have a common 
metric) might also be brought to bear, to add additional insights into the choice 
responses. No attributes were ignored by this respondent, as reported by responses to 
supplementary questions. Looking at the possibility that this individual may also have 
added up FF and SDT and/or Cost and Toll, we cannot find any evidence within the 
„plausible choice‟ test that it would have failed if attribute addition (TotTime, 
TotCost) had not been applied, although this may have assisted in making the choice. 
The following sections of the paper undertake a more formal inquiry using another 
data set collected in 2007 in New Zealand, to delve more deeply into alternative 
„plausible choice‟ tests as well as the role of non-compensatory heuristics in aiding 
our understanding of how stated choice sets are processed in assisting the selection of 
a choice outcome. The paper is organised as follows. We briefly describe the data, 
followed by a statistical assessment of the data in the search for possible rules (or 
heuristics) that explain specific choice responses under specific assumptions. The 
investigated rules and tests focus on the influence of the choice sequence on choice 
response, a pairwise alternative plausibility test and the presence of dominance, the 
influence of non-trading, dimensional vs. holistic attribute processing, the influence of 
relative attribute levels, and revision of the reference alternative as value learning 
across sequenced choice sets. We then discuss the evidence, and conclude with a 
proposal to include two new explanatory variables in choice models to capture the 
number of attributes in an alternative that are „best‟ as well as value learning, together 
                                           
2
 We acknowledge a referee for this observation. 
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with a statement of the degree of confidence one might have in the behavioural sense 
of the data emanating from a stated choice experiment. 
 
Table 1: An Example of 16 Choice Scenario Responses Evaluated by one Respondent  
 
Choice  
scenario Alternative TotTime TotCost Var FF SDT Cost Toll Choice Plausible = Y 
1 1 (SQ) 40 5.4 25 12 28 3.2 2.2 0 Y 
1 2 48 5.7 8 14 34 2.6 3.1 1 Y 
1 3 36 8 6 14 22 4.5 3.5 0 Y 
2 1 (SQ) 40 5.4 25 12 28 3.2 2.2 1 Y 
2 2 40 7.1 8 6 34 4.5 2.6 0 Y 
2 3 44 4.7 6 10 34 1.6 3.1 0 Y 
3 1 (SQ) 40 5.4 25 12 28 3.2 2.2 0 Y 
3 2 28 7 8 14 14 3.5 3.5 1 Y 
3 3 40 2.6 6 6 34 2.6 0 0 Y 
4 1 (SQ) 40 5.4 25 12 28 3.2 2.2 0 Y 
4 2 28 4.5 2 14 14 4.5 0 1 Y 
4 3 48 4.2 8 14 34 1.6 2.6 0 Y 
5 1 (SQ) 40 5.4 25 12 28 3.2 2.2 0 Y 
5 2 44 8 4 10 34 4.5 3.5 0 Y 
5 3 36 1.6 2 14 22 1.6 0 1 Y 
6 1 (SQ) 40 5.4 25 12 28 3.2 2.2 1 Y 
6 2 48 5.1 6 14 34 1.6 3.5 0 Y 
6 3 48 3.5 4 14 34 3.5 0 0 Y 
7 1 (SQ) 40 5.4 25 12 28 3.2 2.2 1 Y 
7 2 44 6.6 2 10 34 3.5 3.1 0 Y 
7 3 48 6.1 8 14 34 2.6 3.5 0 Y 
8 1 (SQ) 40 5.4 25 12 28 3.2 2.2 0 Y 
8 2 36 7.6 6 14 22 4.5 3.1 0 Y 
8 3 20 5.1 4 6 14 1.6 3.5 1 Y 
9 1 (SQ) 40 5.4 25 12 28 3.2 2.2 1 Y 
9 2 48 4.2 2 14 34 1.6 2.6 0 Y 
9 3 28 6.6 8 6 22 3.5 3.1 0 Y 
10 1 (SQ) 40 5.4 25 12 28 3.2 2.2 0 Y 
10 2 20 4.7 4 6 14 1.6 3.1 1 Y 
10 3 44 7 2 10 34 3.5 3.5 0 Y 
11 1 (SQ) 40 5.4 25 12 28 3.2 2.2 0 Y 
11 2 32 1.6 8 10 22 1.6 0 1 Y 
11 3 28 6.1 6 14 14 3.5 2.6 0 Y 
12 1 (SQ) 40 5.4 25 12 28 3.2 2.2 1 Y 
12 2 48 2.6 4 14 34 2.6 0 0 Y 
12 3 40 7.1 2 6 34 4.5 2.6 0 Y 
13 1 (SQ) 40 5.4 25 12 28 3.2 2.2 0 Y 
13 2 24 5.2 6 10 14 2.6 2.6 1 Y 
13 3 48 7.6 4 14 34 4.5 3.1 0 Y 
14 1 (SQ) 40 5.4 25 12 28 3.2 2.2 0 Y 
14 2 40 3.5 6 6 34 3.5 0 1 Y 
14 3 32 5.2 4 10 22 2.6 2.6 0 Y 
15 1 (SQ) 40 5.4 25 12 28 3.2 2.2 0 Y 
15 2 36 6.1 4 14 22 3.5 2.6 0 Y 
15 3 28 5.7 2 14 14 2.6 3.1 1 Y 
16 1 (SQ) 40 5.4 25 12 28 3.2 2.2 0 Y 
16 2 28 6.1 2 6 22 2.6 3.5 1 Y 
16 3 24 4.5 8 10 14 4.5 0 0 Y 
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2 The Data Setting  
 
As part of a larger study to evaluate the costs and benefits of a new tollroad proposal 
in New Zealand, we undertook field work in late 2007 to identify the preferences of a 
sample of 136 commuters, 116 non-commuters and 126 individuals travelling on 
employer business in the catchment area around Tauranga in the North Island of New 
Zealand. A stated choice experiment was included together with questions that sought 
information on a recent trip which was used to construct both the reference (i.e., status 
quo) alternative, and the two other alternatives, which had levels that pivoted around 
the status quo alternative. There were 16 choice scenarios in which the respondent 
compared the levels of times and costs of a current/recent trip against two alternative 
opportunities to complete the same trip described by other levels of times and costs. 
The respondent had to choose one of these alternatives.  The profile of the attribute 
range is given in Table 2 with an illustrative stated choice scenario screen in Figure 1. 
The experimental design was composed of two blocks of 16 choice scenarios each, 
and can be found in full in Appendix A. Respondents were randomly assigned to one 
of the two blocks, with the order in which the 16 choice scenarios were presented also 
randomised. The levels of the design were optimised in accordance with efficient 
design theory, with a d-error measure employed (see Rose and Bliemer 2008 for 
details).   
 
Table 2: Profile of the Attribute Range in the Choice Experiment  
 
Attribute Levels 
Free Flow Time (variation around reference level) -30%, -15%, 0, 15%, 30% 
Slowed Down Time (variation around reference level) -30%, -15%, 0, 15%, 30% 
Trip Time Variability  0, 5, 10, 15 
Running Cost (variation around reference level)  -40%, -10%, 0 ,20%, 40% 
Toll Cost (see note (ii) in text) $0, $0.5, $1, $1.5, $2, $2.5, $3, $3.5, $4 
 
 
 
Figure 1: An example of a Stated Choice Screen 
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A few additional rules were imposed on the design:  
 
(i) Free flow and slowed times3 in the non-reference alternatives were set to a 
base of five minutes if the respondent entered zero for their current trip;  
(ii) To obtain sensible trip time variability levels in minutes, we asked 
respondents to suggest a range of departure times experienced to ensure they 
arrived at their destination at the planned arrival time. This range was used 
to identify the actual trip time variability given the percentages used in the 
design. Where the departure times were reported as the same as the recent 
reference trip, we set an artificial base as per the same rule in (i). 
(iii) Given that tolled routes were currently not available at the time of the 
survey, the proposed new tolled route was assigned a range of values. 
Construction of the new toll road was approved in 2010 with a proposed 
fixed toll in the range evaluated.  
 
In addition, supplementary questions were asked upon completion of all 16 choice 
scenarios on whether specific attributes were ignored. The entire survey instrument 
was programmed as a Computer Assisted Personal Interview (CAPI), that enables the 
attribute levels to be tailored to (i.e., pivoted around) each respondent‟s recent trip 
experience. An interviewer was present and guided the respondents through the survey 
screens. All data is automatically captured in a database. The software has built in 
checks to ensure that all data provided were logical where appropriate (e.g., the travel 
time, given distance, delivered a meaningful average trip speed). Given the focus of 
this paper, other details of the study are not provided. 
 
3 Investigating Candidate Evidential Rules  
 
As a prelude to investigating a number of candidate heuristics (or evidential rules) that 
might contribute to explaining choice response, we continue the theme of „plausible 
choice‟ in the contexts of full attribute relevance and omitting those attributes which 
the respondent claimed not to have considered. The following analyses are performed 
at both the choice set and respondent level, where we use the word „observation‟ to 
refer to a choice set assessment, and „respondent‟ to refer to the assessment over all 
(16) choice sets, with the latter providing evidence that those respondents who fail the 
various tests are exhibiting different behavioural tendencies overall, not just in 
response to a specific feature of the experimental design. We assess the implications 
of the evidence on willingness to pay (WTP) estimates, before investigating five 
speculative but interesting heuristics associated with (i) pairwise alternative 
plausibility and the presence of dominance, (ii) the influence of non-trading, (iii) the 
role of dimensional vs. holistic attribute processing, (iv) the influence of relative 
attribute levels, and (v) the revision of the reference alternative as value learning 
across sequenced choice sets.  
The „plausible choice‟ test presented above for one respondent can be applied 
across the 6,048 observations in the New Zealand data. Appendix B details all 54 
choice sets (or scenarios) where the test failed. An alternative that would fail the test if 
chosen was present in 291 choice scenarios, resulting in a failure rate of 18.6 percent. 
                                           
3
 The distinction between free flow and slowed down time is solely to promote the differences 
in the quality of travel time between various routes – especially a tolled route and a non-tolled 
route, and is separate to the influence of total time. 
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Note that the lack of a toll in some alternative (i.e., non-tolled routes) meant that the 
reference alternative always had at least one best attribute, and so if it was chosen, the 
„plausible choice‟ test could not fail.  Table 3 also shows the proportion (and counts) 
of plausible choice sets by choice task sequence number. When all attributes are 
assumed to be relevant, we find, across all 16 choice sets, that 99.12 percent of the 
observations pass the „plausible choice‟ test associated with one or more attributes 
being best on the chosen alternative (with the percentage varying across the 16 choice 
sets from 100 percent to 98.4 percent). When we omit those attributes which the 
respondent claimed not to have considered, i.e., they were ignored, 95.78 percent of 
the observations pass this test (with the percentage varying across the 16 choice sets 
from 98.41 percent to 94.44 percent), suggesting that regardless of respondents‟ 
claims of attributes being ignored or not, there is a very high incidence of plausible 
choosing. The evidence also suggests that there is no noticeable deterioration in 
plausible choice response as the respondent works through the choice sets from set 1 
to set 16. At the respondent level, we find that the 54 choice observations that failed 
the „plausible choice‟ test were spread across 49 respondents.  
The structure of the design has an impact on the incidence of observations that 
fail the „plausible choice‟ test. If full attribute attendance is assumed, then the test 
cannot be failed if every alternative in the experimental design has at least one best 
attribute. In this empirical setting, only one alternative in the design did not have a 
best level (choice scenario 31 in Appendix A), which might have had some role in 
keeping the incidence rate low (54 observations out of a possible 291). Other choice 
scenarios also allowed the test to fail as a consequence of the forced variability in 
slowed down and free flow time when the recent trip values were less than five 
minutes (rule (i) discussed earlier). Once ignored attributes are taken into account, the 
number of scenarios in which the test is failed can in no way be inferred from the 
experimental design. While there are a finite (albeit large) number of combinations 
with which the attributes can be ignored or preserved, the analyst does not know a 
priori which of these will be chosen. Looking to the entire dataset, it can be 
determined that when accounting for the reported ignoring of attributes, 255 
observations are implausible out of a possible 1,699 choice scenarios where an 
implausible choice could have been made, spread across 99 respondents. 
We also ran two simple logit models (not reported herein) to explore the possible 
influence of the commuter‟s age, income and gender on whether the choice response 
for each choice set was plausible (1) or not (0) under the „plausible choice‟ test. One 
model assumed full attribute relevance and the other accounted for the attributes that 
the respondents stated as ignored (or not preserved
4
). Income and gender had no 
influence, but age had a statistically significant impact when accounting for whether 
an attribute was ignored or not, with the probability of satisfying the „plausible choice‟ 
test increasing as the commuter ages. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
4
 We are starting to see, in the literature, a number of ways of indicating that attributes are 
ignored. A popular language, especially in the environmental literature, is „attribute non-
preservation‟ or „attribute non-attendance‟. 
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Table 3: Influence of Choice Sequence on Choice Response 
 
Choice Set Sequence
Proportion plausible
Count non-
plausible Proportion plausible Count non-plausible
1 0.9894 4 0.9471 20
2 1.0000 0 0.9497 19
3 0.9894 4 0.9392 23
4 0.9894 4 0.9603 15
5 0.9974 1 0.9524 18
6 0.9841 6 0.9603 15
7 0.9921 3 0.9841 6
8 0.9947 2 0.9550 17
9 0.9841 6 0.9444 21
10 0.9894 4 0.9656 13
11 0.9894 4 0.9603 15
12 0.9921 3 0.9550 17
13 0.9894 4 0.9550 17
14 0.9894 4 0.9524 18
15 0.9894 4 0.9709 11
16 1.0000 0 0.9735 10
Assuming full attribute relevance Allowing for attribute being ignored
 
 
Choice task response latencies have been used by Haaijer et al. (2000) and Rose and 
Black (2006) to improve the model fit of the final choice models of interest. We took 
an alternative approach, investigating the relationship between the „plausible choice‟ 
test (both under full attribute relevance and allowing for attributes to be ignored) and 
the amount of time to complete each of the 16 choice scenarios (i.e., the response 
latency). Statistically significant relationships were found between the choice scenario 
completion time and the „plausible choice‟ test, both under full attribute relevance and 
when attribute processing was taken into account, and are reported in Table 4 (i) at the 
choice set level, and Table 4 (ii) at the respondent level. We find that for respondents 
who satisfied the „plausible choice‟ test at the choice set level, the average time to 
complete a choice set was 27.47 seconds, with a standard deviation of 26.03 seconds; 
however when we account for the choice set response being implausible at the 
observation level, we find that the mean time decreases by 5.21 seconds under full 
attribute relevance and 5.58 seconds when ignoring attributes is accounted for. When 
we do the same comparison at the respondent level, we find for respondents who have 
at least one choice set not satisfying the plausibility test, that the average time to 
complete a choice screen decreases by 4.84 and 3.66 seconds for full attribute 
relevance and attribute non-attendance respectively, relative to the respondents who 
pass the test. One possible explanation for this difference in completion time is that 
those who pass the „plausible choice‟ test are more engaged in the choice task. 
Alternatively, those who fail the test might be employing some other heuristic that 
allows them to make a more rapid choice. Clearly, no definitive causal inferences can 
be drawn, despite speculative opinion that such respondents might be less engaged in 
the task. 
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Table 4: Influences on Choice Scenario Completion Time 
Simple OLS Regression 
 
(i) Choice set level 
 Full attribute relevance 
Allowing for attribute 
being ignored 
Constant  22.2963 (17.1) 22.1163 (30.8) 
Full Relevance Plausible Choice Test (1,0) 5.2159 (3.96)  
Plausible Choice Test under  
Attribute Non-Preservation (1,0) 
- 5.5856 (7.5) 
Adjusted R2 0.00035 0.0019 
Sample size 6,048 
(ii) Respondent level 
 Full attribute relevance 
Allowing for attribute 
being ignored 
Constant  23.2659 (53.9) 24.7287 (73.63) 
Full Relevance Plausible Choice Test (1,0) 4.8474 (10.1)  
Plausible Choice Test under  
Attribute Non-Preservation (1,0) 
- 3.6691 (9.01) 
Adjusted R2 0.00040 0.0037 
Sample size 6,048 
 
3.1 Derivative Willingness to Pay 
 
The next task is to estimate choice models at the choice set and respondent level that 
distinguish between (i) the full sample (6,048 observations or 378 respondents) 
assuming all attributes are relevant (Full), (ii) the full sample with choice scenarios 
removed when the „plausible choice‟ test failed (5,994 observations, 329 respondents) 
(Plausible), (iii) the full sample taking into account attribute ignoring as an attribute 
processing strategy (6,048 observations, 378 respondents) (Full APS), and (iv) the full 
APS sample with choice scenarios removed when the „plausible choice‟ test failed 
(5,793 observations, 279 respondents) (Plausible APS). The findings on values of 
travel time savings (VTTS) are summarised in Table 5
5
. We have also included the 
percentage changes in the mean VTTS estimates as a way of identifying the 
behavioural implications of failing the „plausible choice‟ test, as defined by the 
observed attributes that at least one attribute is the best for the chosen alternative, 
regardless of whether it was the reference alternative or not. 
At the choice set level (Table 5(i)), while the differences are marked in some cases, 
none of the differences in mean VTTS are statistically different, especially the 
weighted average VTTS (where the weights relate to the attribute levels for free flow 
and slowed down time, and running and toll cost), using the delta test to obtain 
standard errors
6
. This is the case even when over four percent of the sample is 
removed due to a suspicion of implausible choice behaviour. This finding suggests 
that the underlying model is robust, and able to cope with a small percentage of 
seemingly implausible decisions. However, when we compare the mean VTTS at the 
respondent level (in Table 5(ii)), we find statistically significant differences, given 
standard errors calculated using the delta method and 1,000 random draws. This is an 
important finding, suggesting that the behavioural implications in terms of VTTS is 
not of concern when we focus on individual choice sets, but when we remove entire 
respondents who fail the plausible test on at least one choice set, the differences are 
                                           
5
 All parameter estimates are statistically significant in all four models. 
6
 Details are available on request from the authors. 
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significant. The respondent-level evidence supports the findings of Scarpa et al. (2007) 
who found that the WTP estimates are of a different magnitude when „irrational‟ 
respondents were removed, which were of a considerably higher proportion than in the 
current study. 
 
Table 5: Implications of the „Plausible Choice‟ Test on Mean Values of Travel Time 
Savings 
 
(i) Choice set level 
  
Running cost 
All attributes relevant Allowing for attribute being ignored 
$/person hour (VTTS): Full Plausible Difference Full APS Plausible APS Difference 
Free flow time $13.01 $12.53 3.81% $12.02 $11.62 3.44% 
Slowed down time $13.93 $13.85 0.58% $14.52 $14.53 -0.07% 
Trip time variability $2.57 $2.53 1.58% $2.33 $2.95 -21.02% 
  
Toll cost 
All attributes relevant Attribute processing strategy applied 
$/person hour (VTTS): Full Plausible Difference Full APS Plausible APS Difference 
Free flow time $10.16 $10.51 -3.33% $9.08 $9.73 -6.68% 
Slowed down time $10.88 $11.61 -6.29% $10.96 $12.17 -9.94% 
Trip time variability $2.00 $2.12 -5.66% $1.76 $2.47 -28.75% 
  
      
Weighted average 
VTTS: 
12.49 12.29 1.63% 11.84 11.83 0.09% 
 
(ii) Respondent level 
  
Running cost 
All attributes relevant Allowing for attribute being ignored 
$/person hour (VTTS): Full Plausible Difference Full APS Plausible APS Difference 
Free flow time $13.01 $13.08 -0.54% $12.02 $13.37 -10.10% 
Slowed down time $13.93 $15.06 -7.50% $14.52 $16.89 -14.03% 
Trip time variability $2.57 $3.47 -25.94% $2.33 $3.01 -22.59% 
  
Toll cost 
All attributes relevant Attribute processing strategy applied 
$/person hour (VTTS): Full Plausible Difference Full APS Plausible APS Difference 
Free flow time $10.16 $11.57 -12.19% $9.08 $10.73 -15.38% 
Slowed down time $10.88 $13.33 -18.38% $10.96 $13.56 -19.17% 
Trip time variability $2.00 $3.07 -34.85% $1.76 $2.42 -27.27% 
  
      
Weighted average 
VTTS: 
10.34 12.01 -13.91% 9.55 11.44 -16.52% 
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3.2 Pairwise Alternative ‘Plausible Choice’ Test and the Presence of 
Dominance 
 
So far we have not discussed the possibility of dominance and what role it might play 
as an embedded feature of the design, as well as a response issue. We need to 
introduce some definitions related to dominance in order to be clear as to what 
features of the choice experiment setting we are investigating. Dominance has two 
possible interpretations. The first, which is more common, relates to design issues 
where one would distinguish between (i) the choice set level, where an alternative is 
equal or better on all attributes to another alternative, and (ii) across all choice sets 
shown to a respondent, where a particular alternative is always better on all attributes 
(noting this never happens in our choice experiment designs). The second relates to 
response issues where (i) at the choice set level, the respondent chooses an alternative 
which is best on all attributes, and (ii) at the respondent level across all choice sets, 
where a particular alternative is always chosen regardless of whether it is always the 
best in each choice set. We focus on the second interpretation, but report the extent of 
dominance (as a design issue) in the design being used. It must be noted, however, that 
design and response issues are not independent. In particular, the presence of design 
dominance allows a respondent in a single choice scenario to choose an alternative 
that is equal or inferior on all attributes to another alternative. One reason for this 
might be a preference for or against an alternative, where this might lead to all choice 
responses being made for that alternative or class of alternatives (e.g., status quo (SQ) 
or not status quo). If we considered SQ to be an attribute of the alternatives, then the 
preference for or against SQ might break the dominance condition. However we do 
not know a priori what the sign will be for any one respondent. 
A weaker plausibility test compares the pairs of alternatives, allowing a choice to 
be considered consistent with a number of plausible heuristics such as elimination-by-
aspects (EBA) even when it contains no best attributes, if it has at least one better 
attribute than the rejected alternative on a pairwise comparison. If the pair includes the 
reference alternative, it may be that this contrast delivers an outcome that passes a 
pairwise „plausibility choice‟ test on more occasions.  
On closer inspection, of the 54 choice sets that failed the full choice set „plausible 
choice‟ test from the 6,048 choice sets in the sample, all but one satisfied the pairwise 
„plausible choice‟ test, with 20 of the chosen alternatives having the better level on all 
five attributes, 17 on four attributes, 14 on three attributes, and two on two attributes. 
This suggests that if a three-way and/or a two-way assessment of alternatives are both 
candidate processing strategies, then only one respondent failed both „plausibility 
choice‟ tests on only one choice set.   
Could it be that just as some researchers suggest that there is a bias towards the 
reference alternative, there might be circumstances where the bias is reversed?
7
  For 
modelling, it may be appropriate to remove the reference alternative and treat their 
                                           
7
 Within the environmental economics literature this is actually an often quoted criticism of 
eliciting preferences through stated preference methods (i.e., that people act strategically in an 
hypothetical setting and are more likely to choose a non reference as it provides them with an 
“option” to choose it, even though they would be unlikely to do so in reality).  Related to this 
issue of strategic decision making is yeah-saying (especially in environmental economics case-
studies). Within the context of the transport application herein, this is far less likely to be of 
concern; however it is important to recognise this matter in applications more aligned to 
environmental economics. 
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processing strategy as elimination by alternatives, allowing the reference alternative to 
be specified as „non-existent‟. This is equivalent to ignoring an alternative in contrast 
to an attribute. Within this dataset, 23 respondents chose the reference alternative for 
all 16 choice tasks, while a further 17 respondents chose the alternative for 15 out of 
16 choice tasks. However, with 70 respondents never choosing the reference 
alternative, total avoidance of the reference alternative was much more common than 
total avoidance of the two hypothetical alternatives.  
At a choice set level, if a chosen alternative passes the pairwise comparison test, 
that is, it is better on at least one attribute than the alternative to which it is compared, 
we can state that it is not dominated by the other alternative. Expressed another way, 
the alternative in question is dominated by the other alternative if, for every attribute, 
the attribute level is equal to or worse than the other alternative. While the pairwise 
„plausible choice‟ test applied above to those who failed the three-way „plausible 
choice‟ test found only one case of response dominance at the choice set level, an 
examination of all choice sets for each respondent uncovered a wider pattern of choice 
of a dominated alternative for 46 (out of 6,048) observations. Of the total of 6,048 
choice scenarios, 667 contained a dominated alternative
8
, meaning that 6.9 percent of 
choice tasks containing dominance led to the choice of a dominated alternative. The 
46 cases of dominated alternatives being chosen are summarised in Table 6 (where the 
focus is on response and design dominance). The first two columns indicate which 
alternative dominated the chosen alternative, i.e., which alternative was equal or better 
on all attributes, but still not chosen (e.g., there were 10 choice observations where the 
reference alternative was best on all attributes but not chosen, in contrast there were 28 
choice observations where SC alternative 3 was best but not chosen). Of note is this 
high number for alternative three, stemming from choice scenario 20 in the 
experimental design (see Appendix A), where the reference alternative was inferior, 
on the presented attributes, to the third alternative. One plausible explanation is that 
respondents are not paying as close attention to the third alternative, and hence 
missing a superior alternative. This explanation is supported by the results from the 
base multinomial logit model (see Table 9 below) where an alternative-specific 
constant for the second alternative is positive and significant. In particular, the third 
alternative might have been missed because most of the two hypothetical alternatives 
had a toll attached, whereas the reference alternative never did
9
. Those respondents 
who placed greater disutility on a toll might have disengaged from the hypothetical 
alternatives, or considered all of them as toll road alternatives. If this is the case, then 
it is likely that this phenomenon is occurring in other choice scenarios, when 
dominance is not present, to the detriment of the quality of the dataset. Care should be 
taken to minimise the chance of this happening, via clear instructions to the 
respondent and, if relevant, appropriate training of the interviewers administering the 
survey. 
To be truly effective, the dominance check requires an unlabelled experiment, 
such that the only points of comparison between alternatives are the attributes. In this 
                                           
8
 The 667 choice scenarios containing dominance primarily stemmed from three choice 
scenarios containing dominance in the experimental design (see Appendix A, choice scenarios 
15, 20 and 25). However, the application of various rules to ensure variation in the attribute 
levels of the hypothetical alternatives might have led to the presentation and capture of choice 
scenarios containing dominance that was not present in the experimental design. 
9
 The experimental design did not contain a scenario where the second alternative dominated 
the reference alternative. However, the application of various rules as outlined in the previous 
footnote led to this condition in some of the choice scenarios in the dataset. 
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experiment, while the two hypothetical routes are unlabelled, the reference alternative 
represents their current route, and thus other factors might be influencing whether they 
choose the reference alternative or one of the remaining two alternatives. For nine 
dominated observations, shown in the last column of Table 6, the respondent always 
chose the reference alternative over the 16 choice tasks. This suggests that they were 
not trading over the attributes, such that a new alternative with superior attributes was 
not preferred. Conversely, for 10 dominated observations, the respondent never chose 
the reference alternative, instead trading only between the two hypothetical 
alternatives. The respondent might have been dissuaded from the reference alternative 
by their actual experiences of it. Alternatively, inferences might be made about 
omitted attributes, leading to seemingly implausible choices being made (Lancsar and 
Louviere 2006). The remaining observations were by respondents who chose the 
reference alternative and a hypothetical alternative at least once each. We have no 
clear explanation for their choice of a dominated alternative. A preference for, or 
aversion to, the reference alternative might still have been in effect, except with some 
trading across these alternatives. Alternatively, the dominance might be the 
consequence of not paying attention, for example to the third alternative, as discussed 
above. 
The above examination of dominance assumed that none of the attributes were 
ignored. Just as the number of alternatives in a dataset that lead to failure in the 
'plausible choice' test will be impacted by the particular attribute processing strategy of 
the individual, so too will the presence of dominance in a choice task. If an alternative 
is already dominated by another alternative, then the omission of attributes in the 
comparison will either retain the dominance or lead to a tie between the two 
alternatives. However, a pair of alternatives that, under full attribute attendance, 
present tradeoffs, with some attributes better and worse for each alternative, might 
degenerate into a condition where one alternative dominates the other. Choice of a 
dominated alternative in this scenario might be indicative of several things. A genuine 
mistake might have been made either at the time of choice or when revealing which 
attributes were ignored. Alternatively, the attribute processing rules might vary across 
choice tasks, even though they were gathered once after the completion of the choice 
scenarios in this study (see Puckett et al. 2007 for a study where attribute processing 
strategies were collected after every choice scenario). A consequence of this condition 
is that even when a design is generated that has no dominance when full attribute 
attendance is assumed, the choice scenarios might appear to the respondent to contain 
dominance when their specific attribute processing strategy is taken into account, and 
this might have implications for the effectiveness and/or efficiency of the design. A 
potentially very important area of future research is the design of stated choice 
experiments that are robust to a mix of attribute processing strategies. 
 
Table 6: Response Dominance in the Full Sample 
Number of observations for which each 
alternative dominated the chosen alternative 
Choice behaviour over all 16 tasks for those choice 
observations that were dominated 
Reference 10 Always chose reference alternative 9 
SC Alternative 2 7 Never chose reference alternative 10 
SC Alternative 3 28 Mix of reference and other alternatives 27 
Reference and  SC Alternative 2 1 - - 
Total 46 Total 46 
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3.3 Influences of Non-trading 
 
It is often suggested that respondents are non-traders as a result of always selecting the 
same alternative, especially the reference alternative, across all choice sets. There are 
many reasons posited including lack of interest in the choice experiment, regret 
avoidance, and inertia. We investigated design attribute levels and respondent-specific 
characteristics as possible sources of influence in Table 7 (Model 1) at the respondent 
level, where the binary dependent variable equals 1 for 23 observations who always 
choose the reference alternative across all 16 choice sets, and zero otherwise for the 
remaining 355 respondents. Increased trip length decreases the probability of the 
respondent always choosing the reference alternative, as does a business trip purpose 
(in contrast to commuting and non-commuting). Two attributes that we had expected 
to be significant were not, namely the variability in total time as a percentage of the 
worst time for the reference alternative, and the percentage of total trip time in slowed 
down conditions.  
We then ran a binary logit model (Model 2) to investigate possible systematic 
sources of influence on the choice of the reference alternative at a choice set level. 
This model delivered some very significant sources of influence, suggesting variety 
seeking behaviour (i.e., moving away from always choosing the reference alternative) 
as income increases, trip length increases, the trip is for business, the amount of toll 
road experience increases, and as there is engagement in attribute processing leading 
to an increasing number of attributes being ignored by the respondent (the latter 
obtained from supplementary questions). This latter evidence might be due the 
presence of greater engagement in evaluating the new alternatives. Also, with greater 
 
Table 7: Respondent and Design Influences on the  
Choice of the Reference Alternative 
 
 Full Relevance 
Ignored 
Attributes 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
Reference Alternative 
chosen for all tasks 
Reference Alternative 
chosen for single task 
Base model 2 with 
extra influences 
Base model 2 with 
extra influences 
Constant -1.4881 (-1.59) 1.1683 (9.34) - - 
Time to complete a choice set 
(seconds) 
- 0.0095 (7.95) - - 
Trip length (kilometres) -0.0293 (-2.34) -0.0185 (-15.9) -0.0107 (-8.70) -0.0111 (-8.94) 
Personal gross income ($‟000s)  0.0102 (1.24) -0.0034 (-3.21) -0.0044 (-4.01) -0.0042 (-3.72) 
Business trip (compared to 
commuting and non-commuting) 
-1.670 (-2.22) -0.4048 (-6.78) -0.3999 (-6.47) -0.3995 (-6.34) 
Ref alt time variability as 
percentage of Ref alt worst time 
-1.6012 (-1.02) -0.9469 (-4.86) -1.1422 (-5.58) -1.0013 (-4.84) 
Percentage of total trip time in 
slowed down conditions 
0.5060 (0.46) 0.3588 (2.46) 0.6835 (4.31) 0.4521 (2.92) 
Amount of recent experience on 
toll roads (0-6) 
-0.0147 (-0.11) -0.0342 (-2.03) -0.0465 (-2.65) -0.0416 (-2.33) 
Number of ignored attributes 0.1862 (0.94) -0.0747 (-2.79) - - 
Reference constant (1,0) - - 1.1828 (9.61) 1.1299 (9.11) 
SC1 constant (1,0) - - 0.0730 (1.83) 0.0677 (1.69) 
Free flow time (mins) - - -0.0850 (-26.6) -0.0904 (-26.65) 
Slowed down time (mins) - - -0.0953 (-15.3) -0.1081 (-15.6) 
Trip time variability (plus/minus 
mins) 
- - -0.0067 (-1.14) -0.0102 (-1.48) 
Running cost ($) - - -0.3906 (-20.7) -0.4481 (-20.9) 
Toll cost ($) - - -0.5448 (-27.4) -0.6303 (-30.7) 
BIC 0.5357 1.3027 1.7817 1.7296 
Log-likelihood at convergence -77.50 -3930.20 -5331.12 -5173.80 
Sample Size 378 6048 6048 6048 
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variability in travel times across the reference alternative, respondents are less likely to 
stay with the reference alternative, as expected. However, the sign for the percentage 
of time being in slowed down conditions is positive, which is the opposite effect to 
total time variability. A closer look at the data confirms that there is relatively more 
congestion with shorter trips, which increases the probability of choosing the reference 
alternative.  
Having identified some statistically significant influences on bias in favour of, or 
against, the reference alternative across all choice sets, and at a choice set level, we 
expanded on the binary choice base Model 2 to accommodate the full set of three 
alternatives under full attribute relevance (Model 3) and under attribute non-
preservation (Model 4). The extra reference-alternative-specific characteristics were 
highly significant, and the reference constant became marginally significant and 
positive, suggesting that we have accounted for a growing number of the reasons why 
respondents do not chose the reference alternative. The Bayes Information Criterion 
(BIC), which accounts for the number of parameter estimates, judges a model by how 
close its fitted values tend to be to the true values, in terms of a certain expected value 
(Akaike 1974). The BIC value assigned to a model ranks competing models and 
indicates which is the best among the given alternatives, and is preferred over the log-
likelihood criteria when the number of parameters changes (as a way of avoiding 
overfitting). Model 4 with a lower BIC, is a significant improvement over Model 3. 
 
3.4 Dimensional verses Holistic Processing Strategies 
 
Another pairwise test could be based on the „majority of confirming dimensions‟ 
(MCD) rule (Russo and Dosher 1983), which is concerned with the total count of 
superior attributes in each alternative. Under this test, pairs of attributes are compared 
in turn, with an alternative winning if it has a greater number of better attribute levels. 
The paired test continues until there is an overall winner. In our case, additionally, it 
might be that the reference alternative is dropped first, resulting in only a one-pair test. 
To test for the MCD heuristic in this dataset, a total count of best attributes was 
generated for each alternative, and then entered into the utility expressions for all three 
alternatives. To contribute to the count for an alternative, an attribute had to be strictly 
better than that attribute in all other alternatives in the choice set. That is, no ties were 
allowed
10
. The distribution of the number of best attributes is shown in Table 8, both 
for the full relevance sample, and accounting for attributes being ignored, with 
separate reporting for all alternatives and the chosen alternative only. The distribution 
for the chosen alternative is skewed towards a higher number of best attributes in both 
cases, and higher means can also be observed, which is plausible. This alone does not 
suggest that MCD is being employed, as it would be expected that alternatives with a 
higher number of best attributes would also tend to have higher relative utilities. 
A close inspection shows that the percentage of alternatives with zero strictly best 
attributes is much higher when allowing for attributes being ignored than in the „full 
relevance‟ group (compared to the other rows of evidence). This might suggest that 
respondents are more likely to ignore an attribute when at least one attribute is 
outranked. On this evidence, if found true in other data sets, it has important 
behavioural implications since the analyst may wish to remove alternatives in model 
estimation where the number of best attributes is zero. 
 
                                           
10
 Accounting for ties did not materially affect the findings. 
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Table 8: Number of Strictly Best Attributes per Alternative 
 
 Full relevance Allowing for attribute being ignored 
 All alternatives Chosen alternative All alternatives Chosen alternative 
Number of best 
attributes 
Count Percentage Count Percentage Count Percentage Count Percentage 
0 2758 15.20 467 7.72 4703 25.92 871 14.40 
1 8245 45.44 2563 42.38 8697 47.93 2950 48.78 
2 5482 30.21 2118 35.02 3862 21.29 1707 28.22 
3 1382 7.62 709 11.72 777 4.28 439 7.26 
4 277 1.53 191 3.16 105 0.58 81 1.34 
5 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Total 18144 100 6048 100 18144 100 6048 100 
Mean 1.35 1.60 1.06 1.32 
 
The model results are reported in Table 9, with Model 1 representing the base model, 
with all attributes assumed to be considered. Model 2 extends this base model, such 
that both the attribute levels and the number of best attributes impact on representative 
utility. The latter is highly significant, and positive in sign, so that as the number of 
best attributes increases, an alternative is more likely to be chosen, as would be 
expected. Additionally, an improvement in Bayes Information Criterion (BIC) which 
accounts for the number of parameter estimates can be observed.  
Model 3 reports a model where only the number of best attributes and the alternative-
specific constants are included, and the attribute levels are omitted. While the number 
of best attributes is highly significant, the model fit is considerably worse, suggesting 
that the number of best attributes cannot substitute for the attribute levels themselves. 
The same tests were performed, after accounting for attributes stated as being 
ignored (Models 4 to 6). Any ignored attributes were not included in the count of the 
number of best attributes. Model 4 of Table 9 sets out the base model that accounts for 
attribute ignoring, which itself fits the data better than when all attributes are assumed 
to be attended to. Model 5 presents the model that accounts for both heuristics, and 
Model 6 represents the inclusion of the number of best attributes in the absence of 
explicit consideration of each attribute, after allowing for attributes that are indicated 
as ignored. The BIC is improved, at 1.7483 compared to 1.7514 for the base model, 
with the number of best attributes parameter being statistically significant and of the 
expected sign.  
We report the weighted average VTTS in Table 9 (where the weights are the 
levels of each attribute, namely free flow and slowed down time, and running and toll 
cost) which, at the mean estimate for the weighted average total time, appear to vary 
sufficiently between full relevance and allowing for attributes being ignored, but not 
between models within each of this attribute processing settings when allowance is 
made for the number of attributes that are best. When confidence intervals are 
generated using a bootstrapping procedure with 1,000 random draws from normal 
distributions for relevant parameters, with moments set at their coefficient point 
estimates and standard errors (Krinsky and Robb 1986), we find, as expected that there 
are no statistically significant differences between Models 1 and 2 (and between 
Models 4 and 5); however the differences are statistically significant at 95 percent 
confidence level between the estimates for full relevance and  attribute non-
attendance.  
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Table 9: Influence of Majority of Confirming Dimensions 
 
 Full Relevance Allowing for attributes being ignored 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Base 
Base plus # best 
attributes 
# best attributes Base 
Base plus # best 
attributes 
# best 
attributes 
Reference constant 
(1,0) 
0.0065 (0.13) -0.0418 (-0.84) 0.5228 (15.96) -0.0417 (-0.89) -0.0797 (-1.67) 0.5149 (15.6) 
SC1 constant (1,0) 0 .0749 (1.88) 0.0862 (2.16) 0.1339 (3.75) 0.0669 (1.67) 0.0821 (2.04) 0.1422 (3.95) 
Free flow time (mins) -0.0899 (-28.3) -0.0853 (-26.0)  -0.0949 (-28.0) -0.0884 (-24.9) - 
Slowed down time 
(mins) 
-0.0963 (-16.1) -0.0826 (-12.7) - -0.1146 (-16.9) -0.0983 (-13.4) - 
Trip time variability 
(plus/minus mins) 
-0.0177 (-3.07) -0.0053 (-0.85) - -0.0184 (-2.68) -0.0041 (-0.56) - 
Running cost ($) -0.4147 (-22.2) -0.3871 (-20.1) - -0.4735 (-22.4) -0.4354 (-19.7) - 
Toll cost ($) -0.5312 (-27.5) -0.5274 (-27.4) - -0.6271 (-31.0) -0.6123 (-30.2) - 
# of attributes in an 
alternative that are 
best 
- 0.1041 (4.95) 0.3136 (19.79) - 0.1269 (5.24) 0.4370 (23.9) 
Value of travel time savings ($/person hour): 
Free flow time (based 
on running cost 
parameter estimate) 13.01 13.22 
 
12.03 12.18 
 
Free flow time (based 
on toll cost parameter 
estimate) 10.15 9.70 
 
9.08 8.66 
 
Slowed down time 
(based on running 
cost parameter 
estimate) 13.93 12.80 
 
14.52 13.55 
 
Slowed down time 
(based on toll cost 
parameter estimate) 10.88 9.40 
 
10.96 9.63 
 
Weighted average 
VTTS: 12.48 12.20 
 
11.85 11.58 
 
Number of observations with attribute ignored: 
Free flow time - 944 
Slowed down time  - 1504 
Trip time variability  - 2240 
Running cost  - 1120 
Toll cost  - 656 
Model fit: 
Log-likelihood at 
convergence 
-5428.17 -5417.55 -6224.89 -5265.81 -5252.05 -6123.98 
BIC 1.8051 1.8031 2.0628 1.7514 1.7483 2.0295 
Sample size 6048 
 
While Model 2 (Model 5) compared to Model 1 (Model 4) is an improvement on BIC, 
albeit relatively small, its underlying form suggests that all respondents 
simultaneously consider and trade between both the attribute levels in a typical 
compensatory fashion (both under full relevance and after ignoring some attributes if 
applicable), and the number of best attributes in each alternative. More plausibly, a 
respondent might resort solely to the MCD heuristic, or refrain from using it entirely. 
In recognition that there may be two classes of respondent, with heuristic application 
distinguishing between them, two latent class models
11
 were estimated (Table 10). 
Two classes are defined
12
, where the utility expressions in each class are constrained 
                                           
11
 See Hensher and Greene (2010) for other examples of the identification of attribute 
processing heuristics with the latent class model. 
12
 We investigated a three-class model in which the additional class was defined by all 
attributes plus the number of best attributes. The overall fit of the model did not improve and 
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to represent one of the two heuristics. The first class contains the attribute levels and 
alternative-specific constants, as per the base model, while the second class contains 
only the number of best attributes. A further improvement in model fit is obtained 
with this model, with the BIC under full attribute relevance (and accounting for 
ignored attributes) improving from 1.8051 (1.7514) for the base model, to 1.8031 
(1.7483) for the single class model that contains both the levels and the number of best 
attributes, to 1.7795 (1.7287) for the latent class model. Again the number of best 
attributes parameter is statistically significant and of the expected sign. 
These results suggest that some respondents are employing the MCD heuristic. 
Under the heuristic, trading is not occurring on the absolute attribute levels. What 
matters instead is which alternative has the best level for each attribute, where tallies 
of the number of best attributes appear to act as a supplementary step when 
determining the best alternative. Overall, the mean probability of class membership of 
each class in both models is over 80 percent for processing of the constituent attributes 
and between 15 and 18 percent for the number of attributes being the determining 
influence. 
 
Table 10: Identifying Role of MCD - Latent Class Model  
 
 Full Relevance 
Allowing for attributes 
being ignored 
Class 1 
Reference constant (1,0) -0.4207 (-0.67) -0.0676 (-1.06) 
SC1 constant (1,0) 0.0674 (1.27) 0.0852 (1.51) 
Free flow time (mins) -0.1234 (-16.52) -0.1448 (-16.6) 
Slowed down time (mins) -0.1192 (-11.37) -0.1676 (-12.1) 
Trip time variability (plus/minus mins) -0.0145 (-1.83) -0.0116 (-1.18) 
Running cost ($) -0.5467 (-15.04) -0.6980 (-14.9) 
Toll cost ($) -0.7159 (-12.92) -0.9038 (-18.0) 
Class 2 
# of attributes in an alternative that are best 0.2856 (2.76) 0.2665 (3.06) 
Probability of class  membership: 
Class 1 0.8465 (6.25) 0.8206 (9.58) 
Class 2 0.1535 (6.35) 0.1794 (8.17) 
 
Value of travel time savings ($/person hour): 
Free flow time (based on running cost parameter estimate) 13.54 12.45 
Free flow time (based on toll cost parameter estimate) 10.34 9.61 
Slowed down time (based on running cost parameter estimate) 13.08 14.41 
Slowed down time (based on toll cost parameter estimate) 9.99 11.13 
Weighted average VTTS: 12.60 12.17 
Number of observations with attribute ignored: 
Free flow time (mins) - 944 
Slowed down time (mins) - 1504 
Trip time variability (plus/minus mins) - 2240 
Running cost ($) - 1120 
Toll cost ($) - 656 
Model fit: 
BIC 1.7795 1.7287 
Log-likelihood at convergence -5402.47 -5218.52 
Sample size 6048 
 
                                                                                                                                
many of the attributes were not statistically significant.  We also estimated a three-class model 
with class-specific parameter estimates for attributes included in more than one class, but many 
parameters were not statistically significant. A further model allowing for random parameters 
was investigated but did not improve on the two-class model reported in Table 7. 
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The implication is that the application of the choice model must recognise that the 
trading amongst the attributes occurs up to a probability of 85 percent (or 82 percent 
when accounting for ignoring) on average, with the number of best attribute levels 
having an influence up to a probability of 15 percent (or 18 percent) on average. This 
is an important finding that downplays the contribution of the marginal disutility of 
each attribute in the presence of the overall number of preferred attribute levels 
associated with an alternative. When we compare the mean estimates of VTTS for 
Model 2 (and Model 5) in Table 9 with the latent class models, the mean estimates are 
respectively $12.20 and $12.60 for full relevance and $11.58 and $12.17 when 
attributes are ignored. The latent class mean estimates have moved closer to the mean 
estimates in Table 9 when we do not include allowance for the number of best 
attributes (i.e., Model 1 and 4 in Table 9 of $12.48 and $11.85 respectively). If the 
contrast is with the base models in Table 9, we would conclude that the VTTS 
estimates are not statistically significant in the presence and absence of accounting for 
the „majority of confirming dimensions‟ rule; however differences are significant 
when allowing for attributes to be ignored. This finding supports the evidence in 
studies undertaken by Hensher and his colleagues (see Hensher 2010) that allowing 
for attribute non-attendance has a statistically significant influence on the mean 
estimates of VTTS. 
 
3.5 Influence of the Relative Attribute Levels 
 
Another test relates to the relationship between the level of an attribute associated with 
the reference alternative and each of the other alternatives (Ref-SC1, Ref-SC2). We 
distinguished between differences where a reference alternative attribute level was 
better, equal and worse relative to SC1 and SC2, defined as a series of attribute 
specific dummy variables (e.g., free flow time (FFT) better = 1 if reference FFT minus 
SC1 FFT is negative and equal to zero if reference FFT minus SC1 FFT is positive). 
The choice response variable refers to the alternative chosen. A simple logit model 
was specified in which we included the better and worse attribute forms for all five 
design attributes (eliminating „worse‟ for toll cost only because there were no 
observations). The model is summarised in Table 11. Interpreting the parameter 
estimates is tricky. Where an attribute refers to a better level for the reference 
alternative (the difference for all attributes being negative on the attribute difference as 
illustrated above for FFT), a positive parameter estimate suggests that when the 
difference narrows towards zero, making the reference alternative relatively less 
attractive on that attribute, the probability of choosing a non-reference alternative 
(SC1 or SC2) increases. The parameter estimate is positive for „better‟ except for trip 
time variability, producing the opposite behavioural response, which seems counter 
intuitive (although marginally significant). The opposite behavioural response is found 
when the reference alternative is worse; all parameter estimates are positive suggesting 
that when the reference alternative becomes relatively less attractive (given it is 
worse), the probability of choosing SC1 or SC2 increases. 
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Table 11: Influence of Referencing on Choice Response 
 
6048 observations 
Attributes defined as Reference 
minus SC1 or minus SC2 
Percent of 
data 
Parameter estimates 
Free flow time better 37.7 0.0915 (12.1) 
Free flow time worse 62.3 0.0647 (7.45) 
Slowed down time better 47.8 0.0860 (5.25) 
Slowed down time worse 52.2 0.0770 (10.9) 
Variability in time better 40.5 -0.0347 (-1.89) 
Variability in time worse 59.5 0.0215 (1.84) 
Running cost better 38.8 0.3090 (4.72) 
Running cost worse 61.2 0.4996 (9.69) 
Toll cost better 100 0.6336 (30.4) 
Toll cost worse 0 - 
Stated Choice Alternative 2 
dummy (1,2) 
- 0.1186 (2.96) 
Log-likelihood at convergence -3118.56  
 
3.6 Revision of the Reference Alternative as Value Learning 
 
DeShazo (2002) suggested the idea of reference point revision in which preferences 
may be well-formed, but respondents‟ value functions shift when a non-status-quo 
option is chosen (see also McNair et al. 2010b). The shift occurs because the selection 
of a non-status-quo option is viewed as a transaction up to a probability, and this 
causes a revision of the reference point around which the asymmetric value function 
predicted by prospect theory is centred (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). There is an 
important distinction to be made between value learning, which in its broadest 
meaning implies underlying preferences are changing, and reference revision which 
can occur when preferences are stable but the objective is to maximise the likelihood 
of implementation of the most preferred alternative observed over the course of the 
sequence of questions. The latter is a special case of the former. We focus on value 
learning. 
We ran a model in which we identified the chosen alternative from a previous 
choice set, and created a dummy variable equal to 1 associated with whatever 
alternative was chosen in the previous choice set, be it the initial reference alternative 
or one of the offered non-status quo alternatives (namely alternatives two or three). 
We then introduced into the utility expressions the revised reference dummy variable 
as a way of investigating the role of value-learning. We found (see Table 12) a mean 
estimate of 0.9357 (t-ratio of 15.73) for this variable, which suggests that when the 
reference alternative is revised, in the next choice scenario it increases the utility of the 
new „reference‟ alternative. This is an important finding, supporting the hypothesis of 
DeShazo; it is also recognition of sequential interdependence between adjacent choice 
scenarios, which should be treated explicitly rather than only through a correlated 
error variance specification, where the latter captures many unobserved effects at the 
alternative level. 
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Table 12: Identifying Role of Value Learning 
Note: Choice set 1 is removed 
 
 Full Relevance 
Revised Reference (1,0)(which can be any of the three alternatives) 0.9358 (15.73) 
Free flow time (mins) -0.01033 (-52.3) 
Slowed down time (mins) -0.0972 (-17.4) 
Trip time variability (plus/minus mins) -0.0178 (-2.96) 
Running cost ($) -0.4810 (-36.8) 
Toll cost ($) -0.6163 (-43.2) 
BIC 1.7637 
Log-likelihood at convergence -5027.00 
Sample size 5730 
 
3.7 A Revised Model for Future Stated Choice Model Estimation 
 
We present a model below as a contrast to the base model (Table 9, Models 2 and 5), 
where we include value learning, the majority of confirming dimensions, and attribute 
non-attendance. This model captures a main contribution of this paper. 
Accommodating value learning through reference revision involves treating the first 
choice set differently; to allow for this we introduce a dummy variable for the initial 
reference alternative for choice set one only. We also include design and contextual 
variables that are correlates, to some degree, with the presence of non-trading in terms 
of always selecting the existing (i.e., non-revised) reference alternative across all 16 
choice sets, or selection of the existing reference alternative in a specific choice set. 
The weighted mean estimate of value of travel time savings in Table 13 is $11.19 
per person hour. This estimate can be contrasted with the findings of the „base‟ model 
(reported in Table 5) which only included the design attributes and constants for the 
existing reference alternative (without value learning), namely $12.49 under full 
attribute reference, or $11.84 when we allowed for attributes being ignored. At the 95 
percent level of confidence, the weighted mean estimate of VTTS is significantly 
different and lower. 
 
Table 13: Revised Full Model for Future Applications 
 
 Ignored Attributes 
Trip length (kilometres) -0.0098 (-7.54) 
Personal gross income ($‟000s)  -0.0077 (-7.46) 
Business trip (compared to commuting and non-commuting) -0.3490 (-5.27) 
Existing reference alternative time variability as percentage of worst time -0.8548 (-3.91) 
Percentage of total trip time in slowed down conditions 0.5703 (3.40) 
Amount of recent experience on toll roads (0-6) -0.0304 (-1.61) 
Free flow time (mins) -0.0909 (-23.6) 
Slowed down time (mins) -0.0938 (-12.04) 
Trip time variability (plus/minus mins) 0.0103 (1.34) 
Running cost ($) -0.4539 (-19.0) 
Toll cost ($) -0.6414 (-29.4) 
# of attributes in an alternative that are best 0.2646 (10.0) 
Value learning reference revision (1,0)  which may be the original reference alternative 0.8843 (13.8) 
Initial Choice Set Reference dummy (1,0) for choice set 1 1.1442 (8.99) 
BIC 1.6092 
Log-likelihood at convergence -4600.45 
Sample Size 5793 
Mean Value of Travel Time Savings ($/person hour):  
Free flow time (based on running cost parameter estimate) 12.02 
Free flow time (based on toll cost parameter estimate) 8.50 
Slowed down time (based on running cost parameter estimate) 12.40 
Slowed down time (based on toll cost parameter estimate) 8.77 
Weighted average VTTS: 11.19 
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 4 Conclusions 
 
What does this evidence suggest for moving forward in the use of choice experiment 
data? We have identified a number of features of the choosing process that are 
associated with the design of the choice experiment, and the characteristics of 
respondents, that influence the stated choice outcome. Some very specific heuristics 
appear to have some systematic influence on choice, in particular the number of 
attributes that offer the best levels for an alternative, and the revision of the reference 
alternative as a result of value learning, reflected in a previous choice in the choice set 
sequence. Building both of these features into the estimated choice model seems to be 
a useful step forward in recognition of process rule heterogeneity. We also believe that 
the simple „plausible choice‟ test proposed herein for the entire choice set, and for 
pairwise alternatives, at the observation and respondent levels, is a useful tool in 
eliminating data, if required, that has individuals choosing an alternative that has no 
single attribute that is better. 
Another avenue for reconciling seemingly implausible choice behaviour stems 
from the recognition that the choice might be plausible when a decision or process rule 
is employed by the decision maker. We have handled several decision rules in our 
analysis, namely the treatment of attributes the respondent claimed not to have 
considered, the application of the MCD heuristic, and revision of the reference 
alternative as value learning. However, other processes might be employed by the 
respondents that are not consistent with utility maximisation. For example, Gilbride 
and Allenby (2004) estimated a choice model that handled conjunctive and disjunctive 
screening rules, with choice treated as a compensatory process on the remaining 
alternatives. Here, a choice task that appears implausible might pass the plausibility 
test after some alternatives have been eliminated in the screening stage. Swait (2009) 
allowed the unobserved utility of the choice alternatives to be in one of several 
discrete states. One of the states allowed conventional utility maximisation, while 
other states led to „alternative rejection‟ and „alternative dominance‟. Again, 
plausibility might prevail once the process rule is employed: in this case once rejection 
and dominance has been taken into account. We propose that one way to assess these, 
and other new model forms, is to determine how well they can explain decisions that 
appear implausible when viewed through the conventional prism of utility 
maximisation. 
Of interest to the analyst are possible ways in which implausible behaviour can be 
minimised in a stated choice environment. In our data, there appeared to be no link 
between the task order number and the rate of implausible behaviour, which suggests 
that the number of choice tasks might not have an impact, within reasonable limits. 
Choice task complexity (as defined by dimensions such as number of alternatives, 
attributes and attribute levels) was not varied in this analysis; however the impact of 
task complexity on implausible behaviour would be an interesting area of research. 
Also of interest is the plausibility of choice in market conditions, which may be 
impacted by habit, mood, time pressure, and ease with which information can be 
compared. We anticipate that these influences would lead to a decrease in plausibility 
of choice, either through an increase in errors, or an increase in use of decision rules 
and heuristics. If the aim of a stated choice task is to successfully predict market 
choices, encouraging plausible choice in the stated choice environment might not 
actually be the best way forward. Survey realism might instead be more important. 
This paper will hopefully engender an interest in further inquiry into the 
underlying sources of process heterogeneity that should be captured explicitly in the 
Hensher and Collins, Journal of Choice Modelling, 4(1), pp. 62-89   
 
 
84 
 
formulation of the utility expressions that represent the preference domain of each 
respondent for each alternative. Including additional attribute and alternative-
processing related explanatory variables appear to provide plausible explanations of 
utility maximising behaviour in choice making. Testing of the ideas presented on other 
data sets will enable us to establish the portability of the evidence. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A 
 
  Block 1 Block 2 
Alt. Cset FF SDT Var Cost Toll Cset FF SDT Var Cost Toll 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 17 0 0 0 0 0 
2   -0.15 0.3 -0.3 0.3 3.5  0.15 0.3 -0.3 -0.3 0.5 
3   0.15 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 0   0.15 -0.15 -0.15 0.3 3 
1 2 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 
2   -0.15 -0.3 0.3 -0.15 4  0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 2.5 
3   0.3 -0.15 -0.3 0.15 1   0.15 -0.15 0.15 -0.3 1.5 
1 3 0 0 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 0 0 
2   0.3 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 0  -0.3 0.15 0.15 0.3 0 
3   -0.15 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 0.5   0.3 -0.15 -0.3 0.3 0.5 
1 4 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 
2   -0.3 -0.15 0.3 -0.3 3.5  0.3 0.3 -0.3 -0.15 0.5 
3   0.3 -0.3 0.3 -0.3 2.5   -0.15 -0.3 -0.15 -0.15 0 
1 5 0 0 0 0 0 21 0 0 0 0 0 
2   -0.15 -0.15 -0.3 -0.3 2.5  -0.15 0.15 0.3 -0.3 3 
3   -0.3 -0.15 -0.3 -0.15 3   0.3 0.15 0.3 -0.3 2.5 
1 6 0 0 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 0 0 
2   0.3 0.15 -0.3 -0.3 3.5  -0.15 0.3 -0.3 0.3 1.5 
3   -0.15 -0.3 -0.15 0.15 3.5   -0.15 -0.3 -0.15 -0.15 2 
1 7 0 0 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 0 0 
2   -0.3 0.15 0.15 -0.15 1.5  0.3 0.15 -0.15 -0.3 0 
3   -0.3 0.3 -0.15 0.15 3   -0.3 0.3 0.3 -0.15 4 
1 8 0 0 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 0 0 
2   -0.15 -0.3 -0.3 -0.15 2.5  0.3 -0.3 0.3 0.15 0.5 
3   -0.3 -0.15 0.3 0.15 2   0.15 0.3 0.15 -0.15 2.5 
1 9 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 0 0 
2   -0.3 -0.3 -0.15 0.15 2  -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 0.3 0 
3   0.15 -0.15 -0.3 -0.3 4   -0.3 -0.15 0.3 0.3 4 
1 10 0 0 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 0 0 
2   -0.15 0.3 -0.15 0.15 4  -0.3 -0.15 0.15 0.3 1 
3   0.3 -0.15 0.15 -0.3 1   -0.3 0.15 0.3 -0.3 1.5 
1 11 0 0 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 
2   0.15 -0.3 0.15 -0.3 4  0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 3 
3   -0.15 0.3 -0.3 0.15 2   -0.15 0.15 -0.15 -0.15 3.5 
1 12 0 0 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 0 0 
2   -0.15 0.15 0.3 -0.3 2  -0.3 -0.3 -0.15 0.15 4 
3   -0.3 -0.3 0.15 -0.3 3.5   -0.15 0.15 0.15 -0.15 1.5 
1 13 0 0 0 0 0 29 0 0 0 0 0 
2   -0.15 -0.15 0.3 -0.15 1.5  0.15 -0.15 -0.15 0.15 0 
3   -0.3 -0.15 -0.3 -0.15 4   -0.15 0.15 -0.3 0.3 0.5 
1 14 0 0 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 0 0 
2   0.15 -0.3 -0.15 -0.15 1  0.3 -0.15 -0.15 0.15 1 
3   0.3 0.15 -0.15 -0.3 1   -0.3 -0.3 -0.15 0.3 3.5 
1 15 0 0 0 0 0 31 0 0 0 0 0 
2   -0.15 -0.3 0.15 -0.15 0.5  -0.3 0.3 -0.3 0.3 3 
3   0.15 -0.3 0.15 0.15 3   -0.15 0.3 -0.15 0.3 0.5 
1 16 0 0 0 0 0 32 0 0 0 0 0 
2   -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 2  -0.3 -0.15 0.15 -0.3 3 
3   -0.15 0.3 -0.15 -0.15 0   -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.15 3.5 
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Columns include the alternative number (Alt.), where alternative 1 is the reference 
alternative, a unique choice scenario identifier (Cset), freeflow time (FF), slowed 
down time (SDT), trip time variability (Var), running cost (Cost) and toll (Toll). FF, 
SDT, Var and Cost are all expressed as a proportion of the recent trip values, where 
this proportion is added to the recent trip value. Toll is in dollars. Grey highlighting 
denotes the best attribute level in a choice scenario. Alternatives marked in bold 
denote a situation of dominance under full attribute attendance. 
 
Appendix B 
 
Alt. FF SDT Var Cost Toll TotT TotC Choice 
1 20 0 0 2.6 0 20 2.6 0 
2 17 2 6 2.21 4 19 6.21 0 
3 26 3 4 2.99 1 29 3.99 1 
1 8 2 2 1.2 0 10 1.2 0 
2 7 1 6 1.02 4 8 5.02 0 
3 10 2 4 1.38 1 12 2.38 1 
1 60 0 30 7.8 0 60 7.8 0 
2 51 2 34 6.63 0.5 53 7.13 0 
3 69 2 34 8.97 3 71 11.97 1 
1 25 0 18 3.25 0 25 3.25 0 
2 29 4 12 2.28 0.5 33 2.78 0 
3 29 3 15 4.23 3 32 7.23 1 
1 30 0 5 3.9 0 30 3.9 0 
2 39 2 6 4.49 0.5 41 4.99 1 
3 34 4 6 3.32 2.5 38 5.82 0 
1 22 0 2 2.86 0 22 2.86 0 
2 29 2 6 3.29 0.5 31 3.79 1 
3 25 4 6 2.43 2.5 29 4.93 0 
1 16 0 5 2.08 0 16 2.08 0 
2 21 2 6 2.39 0.5 23 2.89 1 
3 18 4 6 1.77 2.5 22 4.27 0 
1 20 0 5 2.6 0 20 2.6 0 
2 26 2 6 2.99 0.5 28 3.49 1 
3 23 4 6 2.21 2.5 27 4.71 0 
1 22 0 2 2.86 0 22 2.86 0 
2 29 3 4 3.29 1 32 4.29 1 
3 15 2 4 3.72 3.5 17 7.22 0 
1 35 10 2 5.33 0 45 5.33 0 
2 46 8 4 6.13 1 54 7.13 1 
3 24 7 4 6.93 3.5 31 10.43 0 
1 8 2 2 1.2 0 10 1.2 0 
2 10 2 4 1.38 1 12 2.38 1 
3 6 1 4 1.55 3.5 7 5.05 0 
1 40 5 8 5.59 0 45 5.59 0 
2 28 6 5 7.27 3 34 10.27 0 
3 34 6 6 7.27 0.5 40 7.77 1 
1 50 10 10 7.28 0 60 7.28 0 
2 35 13 7 9.46 3 48 12.46 0 
3 42 13 8 9.46 0.5 55 9.96 1 
1 25 5 8 3.64 0 30 3.64 0 
2 18 6 5 4.73 3 24 7.73 0 
3 21 6 6 4.73 0.5 27 5.23 1 
1 45 45 22 9.36 0 90 9.36 0 
2 32 58 16 12.17 3 90 15.17 0 
3 38 58 19 12.17 0.5 96 12.67 1 
1 40 40 35 8.32 0 80 8.32 0 
2 28 52 24 10.82 3 80 13.82 0 
3 34 52 30 10.82 0.5 86 11.32 1 
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Alt. FF SDT Var Cost Toll TotT TotC Choice 
1 15 0 2 1.95 0 15 1.95 0 
2 10 4 4 2.54 3 14 5.54 0 
3 13 4 4 2.54 0.5 17 3.04 1 
1 35 40 12 7.67 0 75 7.67 0 
2 24 52 9 9.97 3 76 12.97 0 
3 30 52 11 9.97 0.5 82 10.47 1 
1 10 25 12 3.25 0 35 3.25 0 
2 7 32 9 4.23 3 39 7.23 0 
3 8 32 11 4.23 0.5 40 4.73 1 
1 22 0 2 2.86 0 22 2.86 0 
2 15 4 4 3.72 3 19 6.72 0 
3 19 4 4 3.72 0.5 23 4.22 1 
1 30 7 6 4.45 0 37 4.45 0 
2 21 9 5 5.78 3 30 8.78 0 
3 26 9 6 5.78 0.5 35 6.28 1 
1 90 0 45 11.7 0 90 11.7 0 
2 63 4 32 15.21 3 67 18.21 0 
3 76 4 38 15.21 0.5 80 15.71 1 
1 65 25 15 10.4 0 90 10.4 0 
2 46 32 10 13.52 3 78 16.52 0 
3 55 32 13 13.52 0.5 87 14.02 1 
1 55 5 12 7.54 0 60 7.54 0 
2 38 6 9 9.8 3 44 12.8 0 
3 47 6 11 9.8 0.5 53 10.3 1 
1 20 20 10 4.16 0 40 4.16 0 
2 14 26 7 5.41 3 40 8.41 0 
3 17 26 8 5.41 0.5 43 5.91 1 
1 80 10 15 11.18 0 90 11.18 0 
2 56 13 10 14.53 3 69 17.53 0 
3 68 13 13 14.53 0.5 81 15.03 1 
1 60 10 12 8.58 0 70 8.58 0 
2 42 13 9 11.15 3 55 14.15 0 
3 51 13 11 11.15 0.5 64 11.65 1 
1 25 0 18 3.25 0 25 3.25 0 
2 18 4 12 4.23 3 22 7.23 0 
3 21 4 15 4.23 0.5 25 4.73 1 
1 55 10 15 7.93 0 65 7.93 0 
2 38 13 10 10.31 3 51 13.31 0 
3 47 13 13 10.31 0.5 60 10.81 1 
1 240 30 30 33.54 0 270 33.54 0 
2 168 39 21 43.6 3 207 46.6 0 
3 204 39 26 43.6 0.5 243 44.1 1 
1 30 15 8 5.07 0 45 5.07 0 
2 21 20 5 6.59 3 41 9.59 0 
3 26 20 6 6.59 0.5 46 7.09 1 
1 30 15 40 5.07 0 45 5.07 0 
2 21 20 28 6.59 3 41 9.59 0 
3 26 20 34 6.59 0.5 46 7.09 1 
1 35 10 2 5.33 0 45 5.33 0 
2 24 13 4 6.93 3 37 9.93 0 
3 30 13 4 6.93 0.5 43 7.43 1 
1 15 5 6 2.34 0 20 2.34 0 
2 10 6 5 3.04 3 16 6.04 0 
3 13 6 6 3.04 0.5 19 3.54 1 
1 15 5 2 2.34 0 20 2.34 0 
2 10 6 4 3.04 3 16 6.04 0 
3 13 6 4 3.04 0.5 19 3.54 1 
1 25 5 18 3.64 0 30 3.64 0 
2 18 6 12 4.73 3 24 7.73 0 
3 21 6 15 4.73 0.5 27 5.23 1 
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Alt. FF SDT Var Cost Toll TotT TotC Choice 
1 40 5 8 5.59 0 45 5.59 0 
2 28 6 5 7.27 3 34 10.27 0 
3 34 6 6 7.27 0.5 40 7.77 1 
1 20 10 8 3.38 0 30 3.38 0 
2 14 13 5 4.39 3 27 7.39 0 
3 17 13 6 4.39 0.5 30 4.89 1 
1 25 10 10 4.03 0 35 4.03 0 
2 18 13 7 5.24 3 31 8.24 0 
3 21 13 8 5.24 0.5 34 5.74 1 
1 25 5 8 3.64 0 30 3.64 0 
2 18 6 5 4.73 3 24 7.73 0 
3 21 6 6 4.73 0.5 27 5.23 1 
 
Grey highlighting denotes the best attribute level in a choice scenario. 
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